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Abstract 
Economic inequality is a problem of global concern and labour unions may have an 
equalising effect on gender wage-differentials. In Sweden, the gender-wage differentials 
underwent a significant decline between 1960 and 1980s but had despite the early progress of 
equalising almost stopped, near to no progress have occurred since then. The Swedish labour 
unions are attributed to have impacted the early development and diminish, which cause one 
to wonder if they are behind the halt. 
 
There is an abundance of research arguing for the correlation between the presence of women 
and equal outcome, a correlation that is absent in the Swedish case of wage formation. In 
order to clarify the paradox and contribute to existing research, this thesis approached the 
matter from the angle of insider-outsiders and the theory of split labour markets. Moreover, 
the thesis has analysed how the labour union agenda change in response to economic and 
political impact mechanisms and aimed to understand what the politics of presence fail to 
explain, why organisations implement gender equalising policies in times of low women 
presence while turning inwards and dismissing equalising policies in times of high women 
presence. 
 
Through process tracing the thesis unveiled how economic and political mechanisms change 
the behaviour of labour unions, and the findings indicate that economic circumstances form 
the boundaries in which labour unions form their agenda. The findings indicate that high 
economic growth is a premise for equalising policies, while recession created an environment 
in which solidarity is neglected. 
 
Keywords: Insider-Outsiders, Split Labour Market, Equalisation and Labour Unions 
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1 Introduction 
Economic inequality is a topic of continues global concern that will prevail beyond our 
generation if not addressed adequately. One of such inequalities is the gendered-wage gap 
argued to be not only prevailing but a hinder for economic development (World Economic 
Forum 2018) and this thesis intends to look at a lone bright spot when it comes to gender 
equality: Sweden. The gender-wage differentials started to the decline in Sweden around 
1960, progress attributed to the agreement to abolish separate wage rates for women and 
move toward a unitary wage structure. This agreement was concluded between the Swedish 
Trade Union (LO) and the Swedish Employers Association (SAF) (Tsarouhas 2009:59-61; 
Hirdman 1998:60). The equalisation of wages came to a halt during the 1980s, raising 
questions regarding whether this is a reflection of policy choices and if so, what caused the 
progress to halt. 
 
In the influential book “the Politics of Presence”, Anne Phillips (1995) argues that presence 
and group composition within legislative bodies matter for representative outcomes. Scholars 
in the field indicate that women are the only effective actor voicing the concerns and interests 
of women (see, e.g. Wägnerud 2009; Childs & Krook 2009; Mansbridge 1999). High 
presence, as in a high degree of women representatives should reflect itself in a higher degree 
of policies representing women’s interests. However, the Swedish case is a paradox, as LO 
embraced the abolishment of separate women wages at a time were women representation 
within LO remain low. In the 1980s, when the representation was rather high, the progress of 
equalisation came to a halt (Larsson 2014:7; Alos & Nygaard 2018:3). Scholars of politics of 
presence have left a gap and fail to explain the reasons behind adopted equalising policies in a 
time of low representation and why high representation results in a halted progress (diagram 
1). 
 
Moreover, the primary function of a labour union is to advocate and represent their members 
toward the employers and to protect and bargain for their increased welfare, improved 
working conditions, and wages (Volscho & Kelly 2012; Kelly 2005). Labour unions are not 
only a critical actor advocating for working-class interests but also an important intermediary 
actor for solving disagreements between workers inside the union. Important as the phase 
before advocacy includes internal negotiations and bargaining in terms of what agenda to 
pursue (Lindberg 2013). Negotiations that follow a pattern of deliberative democracy, 
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aggregating individual interests into organisational interests constituting the agenda (Hyman 
1997; Phillips 1995: 150) and the outcome of such process tend to neglect gendered interests 
(Munro 2001). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In the diagram, we can see that women constituted 22,5% of the members of LO in 1960, but 
even more noteworthy is the composition of 1946 when only 16% of the members were 
women, and the first significant breakthrough occurred. LO delivered a report on how to 
equalise the gender-wage differentials. Here a scholar in the field of politics of presence 
might raise the importance of critical actors or mention that 16-22,5% might be above some 
form of threshold (Childs & Krook 2009). To complicate the matter further, note that only 
eleven women were attending the LO Congress of 1946 and only one woman was part of the 
negotiating body between 1946 and 1960 (Hirdman 1998; LO 1946) while 43% of the 
members were women during the 1980s. 
 
In sum, the politics of presence fails to explain the paradoxical development of wage-
differentials. To provide an explanation the thesis turns to a combination of two theories, the 
split labour market theory (Bonacich 1972;1979) and insider-outsider theory (Lindbeck & 
Snower 1986; Rueda 2005). These theories share the analysis of social relations and wage 
differentials as both a cause of and generated by the dualistic nature of the labour market. By 
Source for the calculation of gender wage differentials: Larsson, 2014 
Sources for the calculation of women members: Johansson & Bergold, 2013; LO-
congress protocol 1946;1951;1956;1961;1966 
Diagram 1 
Women's wages compared to men's, 1940-2012. Percentage. Industry Sector. 
Total proportion of women members in LO, including all affiliated unions, 1946-2012. 
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understanding the complex social world as dual, we see the world as composed by privileged 
groups and unprivileged groups, insiders and outsiders. Hence, this combination will allow us 
to understand what mechanisms impact the labour union behaviour (Duke 2018, p.6; Subašić, 
Reynolds & Turner 2008) and how that affects the wage formation process as a tool for 
equalisation. 
 
1.1 Aim and Research Questions 
Therefore, I contend that the insider-outsider and split labour market theory can provide the 
framework to understand labour market behaviour, wage formation and what cause unions to 
divert from their otherwise path-dependent behaviour (Acker 2006). These theories suggest 
that economic mechanisms and political mechanisms are the most potent mechanisms insofar 
that the actors in the labour market want to protect their jobs, wages and their position of 
power. As such, I predict that the economic circumstances will either facilitate or impede the 
possibility of equalising wage policies. 
 
By applying the method of process tracing, this prediction will be transformed into a causal 
mechanism with variation in the value of economic circumstance. The causal mechanism will 
be probed by analysing two policy outcomes: the abolishment of separate women wages to 
understand what caused LO to adhere to women interests despite their low presence, and the 
Metalworkers Unions breakout from central negotiations led by LO. Thereto, the abolishment 
of separate women wages occurred in time of economic boom, while the Metalworkers 
breakout occurred in time of recession.  
 
1.2 Outline of the thesis 
This thesis will be structured as follows. The next section will discuss previous research on 
the topic of union behaviour and outline how economic circumstances and political context 
affect labour union behaviour, as well as the labour market wherein they act. Section three 
outlines the theoretical framework based on the insider-outsider theory and the split labour 
market theory, which will merge into a theoretical model. In section four, the research design 
and methodological considerations will be outlined. Section five constitute the analysis 
section and discuss the empirical evidence of the two policy cases. Afterwards, the thesis 
wraps up with a theoretical discussion and end with conclusions. 
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2 Previous research 
This section will discuss previous research based on the two selected theories and divided into 
two sub-sections. Each section outlines one impact factor that has shown itself able to change 
otherwise path-dependent behaviour of unions. To mention, it will discuss different patterns 
of antagonism based on both ethnic, and gender divides, and how unions have changed their 
approach toward equalisation when economic or political factors impact their context. 
 
Moreover, before moving further, the terms antagonism and agenda need clarification. The 
term antagonism is here selected words as conflict, as to describe the relationship between 
groups in the labour market, and the prime advantage is that it avoids moralistic assumptions 
on a theoretical basis. I here follow the arguments laid out by Edna Bonacich, and her idea 
that the word conflict tends to view in-group or between-group conflicts as one-sided, while 
antagonism views it as a process of mutual interaction (1972). As such, it allows the analysis 
to start with as few pre-conditioned assumptions as possible.  
 
The term agenda has a central place in this thesis and has several meanings. However, in this 
thesis agenda are used to describe the union strategy, being the outcome of the aggregation of 
interests that the internal decision-making process entails. It is as such, not used to describe 
the list of matters discussed but used to describe unions main concerns and forwarded claims 
during the wage bargaining process (Kingdon 2014:3). 
 
2.1 Economic mechanisms 
Organisations tend to act path dependent, which may result in the persistence of hierarchies 
and inequalities. While organisations with explicit egalitarian goals tend to fail with equality, 
research indicates that societies that thrive and are opulent have a higher tendency to break 
hierarchical structures and inequality despite their persistent structure (Acker 2006). Duke 
argues that unions embrace less privileged groups as a measure to protect their position in 
periods of economic boom as the need for workers might result in their replacement 
(2018:32). 
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As mentioned, unions play a crucial role in intermediating interests between groups of labours 
as well as advocate for the enhancement of working-class welfare. This often has the effect of 
creating antagonism, as in the case of the US and their ethnic antagonism in the labour 
market. However, the level of antagonism has had various effect and manifestations. On the 
American West Coast, the labour market has witnessed reluctance towards immigrants and 
exclusionary tendencies as labour unions engaged in various activities to block Asian 
immigrants from entering the labour market. When posing the threat of losing jobs or facing 
the risk of being undercut by low-wage workers, union tend to act to protect their superior 
role in the labour market (Bonacich 1996). Meanwhile, in the American South unions has 
acted inclusionary of black workers, a behaviour caused by the shortage of labour. The 
common denominator between the two cases is suggested to be protecting the own group 
from being undercut by inferior working groups (Bonacich 2008). 
 
The US provides further examples of how impact mechanisms and sudden changes to society 
affect the behaviour and level of equalisation. During WWII, as a direct effect of war, most 
male workers were exhausted, causing an imminent shortage of labours which entailed 
women workers to enter the industrial sector. A previously male-dominant sector now 
witnessed an influx of women worker. Unions meet with resistance, and the remaining male 
workers initiated strikes. Aiming to protect their superior position and restrict women workers 
to specific low-skilled jobs, at lower wages and succeeded (Milkman 1982). This illustrates 
how union behaviour create antagonism and a segmented labour market in response to 
economic change 
 
Labour shortage is often mentioned as the cause behind diversion and change of agenda, and 
the behaviour of the Apartheid regime in South Africa is a prime example of how economic 
interests change behaviour. While the initial plan of the regime was to enforce the total 
exclusion of the South African population, shortage of labour and economic uncertainty 
caused the leaders to divert from their initial agenda. As the only available workers were 
black, the regime was forced to allow blacks into the labour market to ensure financial 
welfare. However, they added the implementation of townships as a measure to uphold 
division and segregation in society (Tilly 1999:90). While not an example of total equalisation 
or even equalisation, it highlights how economic concerns impact the behaviour or leaders 
and groups to adapt or change whether they want or not. 
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Before moving on to the next impact factor, we should note that contention among scholars 
exists as to what causes and generates a particular behaviour. While some argue that 
behaviour is impacted by economic changes and material interests (e.g. Frymer 2018 in Duke 
2018:22), others argue that antagonism between groups, gender or ethnic, are guided by plain 
and straightforward racism or prejudice (Calliste 1995). Racism or prejudice exists and may 
well cause particular behaviour, but economic factors can impact the level of equalisation 
between groups in a society. 
 
In the case of unions, scholars argue that as unions aim to enhance their members' welfare and 
protect or strengthen their position in the labour market their agendas have to follow 
economic circumstances (Holden 1990; Davidsson & Emmenegger 2012:207). The 
assumption is that economic growth increases the amount of available rents to collect, hence, 
increases the tendency to form encompassing agendas aiming for equalisation while recession 
tends to cause exclusionary behaviour and protection of the core member interests. 
 
2.2 Political mechanisms  
Another factor that has an impact on the course of action and behaviour of unions is the 
political context. Duke indicates that the relationship between a union and a political party 
effect union behaviour, as they may apply pressure on the union to refrain from either 
exclusionary or inclusionary agendas (2018:31). Which is relevant in the Swedish case, as the 
relationship between LO and the Swedish Social Democratic Party (SAP) have been depicted 
as intimate, and SAP have been in government for most of Sweden’s modern era (Tsarouhas 
2008:3; Martin 1992:15) 
 
However, if exclusionary tactics remain the most beneficial for the union members welfare, it 
is highly uncertain how impactful political pressure is to change or steer union behaviour. 
Scholars argue that changes to the labour market framework seem to impact their behaviour, 
changes that can take the form of direct intervention as an implementation of regulation 
against discrimination (Calliste 1995). Iversen suggests that union power is pre-conditioned 
by the governmental policies and mention that policies such as Keynesian full employment 
policies and strong social welfare impact the degree of freedom to act (1999). 
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Political-union relations can be exemplified by looking at how the political context during the 
British Mandate, 1920-1948, impacted union behaviour and chances to pursue inclusionary 
tactics. While Jewish unions intended to embrace Arab workers interests, the hostile 
environment at the political level hindered Jewish unions from forwarding an agenda of 
equalisation and acting inclusionary (Duke 2018:22). Furthermore, on the premise that the 
goal for politicians is to win elections, their agenda runs along with the opinion of the general 
electorate (Lindvall & Rueda 2015; Rueda 2005). As such, unions cannot forward agendas 
that might upset the general public as they then might risk the interference of political parties 
in the labour market, which would impact unions position.   
 
Moreover, full employment policies tend to protect and facilitate unionism and hence, a high 
degree of bargaining power (Rothstein 2014: 291, 305). Thereto, strong unions have fewer 
incentives to adhere to outsiders, then the reverse (Emmenegger 2011). This became evident 
during the civil right era, in the US, when unions embraced the interests of non-unionised 
black workers that sparked their enthusiasm and large numbers of black workers joined the 
union. When the union had increased their bargaining power through the embrace of black 
worker interests, and the political context shifted toward the original union members benefit, 
the union dismissed the interests of black workers and recurred to the old agenda (Nelson 
1996). 
 
In sum, labour union behaviour is complex and can manifest itself different due to the 
strength of impact factors. Both Bernstein and Bonacich highlights the need to combine and 
to analyse different impact mechanisms to understand union behaviour, as the unions' agenda 
evolves in correspondence to as discussed here: economic mechanisms and political 
mechanisms. Hence, these will be used together with the theoretical framework outlined in 
the next section to probe whether the level of equalisation is affected by union behaviour. 
 
3 Theoretical framework 
To probe the effect of these impact factors on union behaviour, their wage policy, and the 
equalising effect of wage formation. This section will outline the theoretical framework. Built 
upon the two theories: the insider-outsider theory and split labour market theory and this 
section are divided into three sub-sections: the first discusses the insider-outsider theory, they 
second the split labour market theory, and these will be merged into a theoretical model in the 
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third sub-section. The theoretical model will provide an understanding of how the rest of the 
thesis plays out. 
 
3.1 Step 1: Insider-outsider theory 
As the name suggests, the insider-outsider theory analyses the behaviour of insiders and 
outsiders. The stronger group labelled as insiders, and in this thesis, they constitute the core of 
the union, being at the top of the union hierarchy and in control of the union agenda. 
Therefore, union agenda and its effect on inequality in terms of wage-differentials, are, to a 
large extent a reflection of insider members interests (Duke 2018:22; Davidsson & 
Emmenegger 2012:211). 
 
Lindbeck and Snower initially developed the theory as a way to understand why wages in the 
labour market stays above the equilibrium, contrary to the theory of demand and supply. To 
understand why unemployed individuals as outsiders did not undercut employed workers to 
gain access in the labour market, they argue that we have to analyse unions. They can 
organise workers (insiders) to cooperate while refusing to cooperate with outsiders. Thereto, 
if employers try to replace insiders with outsiders or threat with decreasing wages, the union 
have the power to initiate obstructive activities, creating a productivity divide and a labour 
turnover cost. In sum, employers instead meet the demands of insiders as the price to replace 
them is higher than meeting their demands (Lindbeck & Snower 1986), 
 
The theory has been used to analyse left-party strategies and indicate a tendency to navigate 
between insider and outsider interests. If a left-party move too far to the left, outsiders might 
turn away to right-wing parties, and if they move too far to the right, insiders might turn to 
other left parties. In sum, when embracing and deciding upon an agenda, parties have to 
calculate whether they can win or lose support (Lindvall & Rueda 2012; Rueda 2005). Labour 
unions thrive when they posit a large member base; therefore, this might apply to unions as 
they need to attract workers and their behaviour is as such similar to that of left-parties 
(Lindberg 2013). 
 
In the Swedish labour market, unions have been able to reduce within sector wage 
differentials but unable to reduce the wage-differentials between sectors. Edin and 
Richardsson argue that this is evidence of conflictual behaviour between unions, based on 
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survival of the fittest (Edin & Richardsson 2002). Their argument follows the assumption that 
antagonism on the labour market emerges between groups of different economic status, or 
security in the labour market (Lindvall & Rueda 2014; Rueda 2005). Furthermore, Lindbeck 
and Snower argue that union thrive when the economic context enables high productivity and 
rents to be exploited, and a political atmosphere that allows and protect the right to initiate 
obstructive activities. Contrary, recession cause insiders to protect themselves from 
undercutting (Lindbeck & Snower 2001). 
 
In sum, the insider-outsider theory examines the dualistic nature of the labour market based 
on the idea that the privileged are insiders and outsiders being the unprivileged. The insiders’ 
behaviour is guided by job security and rents available to collect (e.g. Lindbeck & Snower 
2001). 
  
3.2 Step 2: Split labour market theory 
Analogous to insider-outsider theory, the SLM theory argues that antagonism emerges when 
wage differentials exist between two or more groups in the labour market competing over 
returns from employers. These differentials beget competition as employers want to exploit 
these differentials and maximize their return by lowering the cost of labour. Similar to the 
insider-outsider theory, SLM argues that higher paid groups initiate various exclusionary or 
inclusionary tactics to avoid being substituted or downgraded (Bonacich 1979; Bernstein 
1995;1998 & Calliste 1995). The main difference between the two theories is the way of 
discussing the obstructing activities and how the insiders protect their superior position. 
 
They also differ in the regard that SLM depicts the labour market as a three-party conflict, 
that between high-priced labour and employers over rents, and low-priced labour as inferior 
actors with the sole purpose to compete. The SLM theory would explain the behaviour of 
unions on the American West coast in exclusionary terms, as they want to close the market to 
protect their superior position (Bonacich 1972). While the SLM tend to focus on exclusionary 
events, Bernstein shows that unions forward equalising agendas to diminish differences 
between groups, as to eradicate their competition. They assume that there is no advantage 
behind replacing one employer with another if the price is equal. Therefore, small wage-
differentials can safeguard the job positions of the insiders (Bernstein 1998). 
 14 
While most of the research in the field of SLM discuss ethnic antagonism, Bonacich argues 
that the same pattern is prevalent between all groups. With economic differences and wage 
differentials, comes antagonism (Bonacich 2008). Moreover, both the insider-outsider theory 
and split labour market theory argue that union behaviour follows the interests of the 
privileged and that the mechanism and cause of conflict between high- and low-priced labour 
is material interests. 
 
However, the degree of division differs though and is dependent upon economic factors and 
political context (Duke 2018; Lindvall & Rueda 2014; Emmenegger 2011). To some degree, 
all strategies are ways for insiders to maintain their position of power and to prevent 
undercutting (Lindberg, 2013; Lindbeck & Snower 2001 & Bonacich 1979). The SLM theory 
discusses three types of strategies: exclusion, caste systems, and equalisation. All of which is 
strategies used to prevent interfering labour groups from undercutting the position of the 
insider (Duke 2018:23). 
 
As discussed in the sections of impact mechanisms, labour market relations and union 
behaviour are complex to evaluate as diverse strategies are used. Factors which do not stem 
from the labour market have a profound impact on it, and the behaviour evolves and changes 
under the impact of several factors (Bernstein 1998). In sum, both theories in use for this 
thesis share the idea that the labour market presents itself with weaker and stronger labour-
groups and that union behaviour directly affect the divide (Duke 2018; Lindbeck & Snower 
2001). 
 
3.3 Step 3: Theoretical model 
In this section, the previous research and theoretical concepts will be summed up and merged 
into a theoretical model (figure 2). The primary objective of this model is to clarify the 
linkages between the different concepts, and not it is testing. The method and analytical 
framework to probe whether the propositions hold will be presented in the next section. 
 
The model is divided into three boxes, representing the impact mechanisms, the decision-
making arena and the union wage policy. The decision-making arena constitutes LO and its 
internal process of aggregating interests that form their agenda. Within this playground, I 
expect there to be insiders with direct and superior access to the agenda. It is indicated by the 
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solid line (A). The insiders’ access and power over the agenda are independent of impact 
factors, but they may steer their behaviour. 
 
Moreover, the outsiders are members within the union with little to no access to the actual 
formation of the agenda. It is manifesting itself in cases where the union are devoting 
relatively low attention toward their interests during the negotiations with the employer side. 
Thus, indicated by their dotted line (C), and their access hinges on support from the impact 
mechanisms. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The assumption is that the impact mechanisms: economy and political circumstances may 
turn the dotted line between outsiders and the agenda solid. Furthermore, the line between 
impact mechanisms and the decision-making arena is dotted to indicate their variation in 
strength. However, as will become evident in the next section, the success of the hypothesis 
hinges on the idea that these mechanisms steer the behaviour of the labour union. Finally, the 
agenda beholds the aggregated interests and are such connected to the wage formation box 
through a solid line (D) as some form of negotiation always occurs between unions and 
employers, regardless of the level of antagonism between insiders and outsiders. This 
theoretical model will be transformed into a causal mechanism discussed in the next section. 
Decision-making arena 
Insiders Outsiders 
Union 
Agenda 
Impact mechanisms 
- Economy 
- Political context 
B 
A 
Figure 1 Theoretical model 
D 
C 
Wage policy  
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4 Research design and methodology 
The following section will discuss the choice of process tracing as a method, outline the 
research design, including the hypothesized causal mechanisms. Moreover, to link the 
discussed theoretical assumptions to the empirical findings a methodological framework has 
to be outlined. The method of process tracing has been selected to probe whether variations in 
equalisation between groups are affected by the key impact factors discussed in previous 
sections (Beach & Pedersen 2016; Bennet & Checkel 2014:3).  
 
4.1 Process tracing 
Within the field of political science, process tracing has gained attention as a method for the 
identification of mediating causal mechanisms that link cause with outcome, the dependent 
variable with the independent. Thereto, the study of a causal mechanism allows us to outline 
the processes between a cause and an outcome, by studying and unpacking each part of the 
causal chain (Beach & Pedersen 2016:302; George & Bennet 2005:586). As such, the focus is 
not on examining the outcome but rather the causal chain comprised of mechanisms 
(Esaiasson, Giljam, Oscarsson & Wängnerud 2010:144-145). 
 
For process tracing to be a suitable method in the field of political science research, 
methodological and research transparency is of utmost importance. We need to outline the 
causal mechanism that will be probed and guide its construction from the theoretical 
framework (Collier 2014; Bennet & Checkel 2014:9; Beach & Pedersen 2016). In essence, a 
discussion regarding how the causal mechanism links to the previous sections will follow 
below. As well as expectation in regards of what type of evidence that strengthen the 
existence of each of its parts, referred to as systems understanding of mechanisms (Beach 
2017). 
 
Understanding the process between X and Y in this way, differ from notions as the minimalist 
understanding of mechanisms and the idea of intervening variables. While researchers using 
the minimalist understanding also trace evidence for each part, it fails to explain how each 
part is interlinked resulting in the in-between parts, depicted in the figure below (figure 2), to 
remain empirically and theoretically understudied. The concept of intervening variables 
implies a need to obtain empirical evidence from across-cases and is therefore dismissed as it 
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rules out within-case research (Beach & Pedersen 2016:272; Bennet & Checkel 2014; 
Waldner 2014:132). 
 
 
 
 
The above graph is a prototype to the actual causal mechanism presented below (figure 3), 
and function as a tool to highlight its different elements (Waldner 2014:128). Thus, the figure 
depicts the elements of the causal mechanism that starts with X, the cause and initiating effect 
running through various mediating parts (M1, M2) concluding at Y, the outcome. The casual 
process can be visualised as domino bricks falling, and X being the initiator (Bennet & 
Checkel 2014:6). Moreover, the arrows in the graph are of utmost interest to the 
understanding of the causal graph as they connect the mediating parts, “in such a way that 
they are jointly sufficient for the outcome” (Waldner 2014:131).  The arrows are; therefore, 
integral parts of the causal mechanism and all hypothesized parts have to exist for the 
hypothesized causal mechanism to function (Beach & Pedersen 2016:35).  
 
Furthermore, process tracing can be divided into four variants and the choice of variant 
depend on the research purpose (Beach & Pedersen 2016:304). These four belong to either, 
theory-centric or case-centric process-tracing. Research of case-centric art aim to examine and 
provide a comprehensive explanation of a single historical case, and therefore only produce 
case-specific explanations with low generalisability. I contend that this thesis is a theory-
centric research on the basis of my use of systems understanding of mechanisms, which also 
enables stronger inference possibilities if the empirical analysis supports my hypothesis 
(Beach & Pedersen 2016:305).  
 
Furthermore, within theory-centric research, we find theory-building and theory-testing, and 
in short, this thesis does not aim to trace where a causal mechanism failed or to establish 
evidence for what conditions are required for the flawed mechanism to function. Hence, this 
thesis is not of theory-building art. Instead, the hypothesized causal mechanism are based on 
existing theories and provide propositions regarding what empirical evidence I expect to find. 
These expectations are then probed through process tracing and sources evaluated (Beach & 
Pedersen 2016:305). 
 
Figure 2 A causal graph 
 
X à M1 à M2 à Y 
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4.2 The causal mechanisms and propositions 
With the above in mind, the following causal mechanism (figure 3) is constructed to probe  
whether economic variation generates difference in behaviour and in elongation difference in 
wage formation policy. Moreover, the causal mechanisms, the parts, are in the systemic 
understanding of mechanisms understood as semi-theories. Hence, the hypothesized causal 
mechanism has been constructed while extrapolating the previous research for pieces of 
evidence that can strengthen the assumption of similar behaviour in this case. The guidelines 
for such process are scarce and the idea is to search for probability, therefore, to assume 
behaviour using evidence from another context implies uncertainty (Beach & Pedersen 
2016:319). The section continues by outlining the mechanistic propositions; how the parts are 
expected to function. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The mechanism starts with economic circumstances as the cause, initiator of the domino-
effect resulting in the formation of the union agenda, which affect the level of equalisation 
between groups. This is based on the centrality of economic and material interests in both 
insider-outsider theory (Lindbeck & Snower 1986) and the split labour market theory 
(Bonacich 1972;1979). The assumption is that times of boom increases production and creates 
low levels of unemployment, premises for an encompassing union agenda. Contrary, the 
effect of recession will result in decreased production and increased unemployment which is 
negative for equalisation and encompassing union agendas. 
 
This will then set in motion a process starting with political signals, referring to political 
actors expressing their view on the economic situation. In time of boom the expectation is that 
the government would loosen the grip of the market and as such allow the labour market 
social partners to negotiate more freely. Contrary, in times of recession political actors would 
put constraints, or express the need for caution in terms of wage-and welfare improvements 
Figure 3 Hypothesized causal mechanism 
Economic 
circumstances Part 1 Part 2 Part 3 Union agenda 
Political signals 
Labour market 
change 
Strategical 
choice 
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for the workers. In short, this proposition is based in the intimate bond of unions and political 
parties and the indication that unions need to attract members and cannot act out of pure self-
interests (Lindberg 2013; Rueda 2005). 
 
Followed with the labour market changes. The expectation is based on the research of 
Milkman (1982) and Lindbeck and Snower (1986), that boom will lead to shortage of labour 
and announcement of export growth, which both creates a situation in which the union are 
unable to provide the labour market with workers of their own and forward encompassing 
agendas to equalise wages and protect the insiders. Contrary, times of recession will lead to 
overflow of labour, decline of export generating industrial squeeze and a free-for-all 
environment. 
 
Ultimately, strategical choice within the Swedish labour movement. In times of boom the 
inside members embrace outsider interests as their own interests will not be affected by this 
appeal. Thereto, an appeal will raise the thresholds to enter the labour market and hence 
increase their own value. In times of recession, the reality of overflow of labour and decline in 
export and collectable returns affect the agenda and calls for dismissal of outsider interests 
emerge as insiders invoke that there are no room for catch-all agendas. 
 
These propositions and the hypothesized causal mechanism will be transformed into two 
causal mechanisms, with variation in the value of economic circumstance: boom (table 1) and 
recession (table 2). These will also function as the analytical framework and are found on the 
next page. To probe the causal mechanism, we need to collect empirical evidence and the 
process of data collection will be discussed in the next section, 4.3. 
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Table 1  A hypothesized causal mechanism linking economic boost and the abolishment of separate women wages 
 Scope condition: LO’s embrace of abolishment of women wages 
Causal 
mechanism Cause Part 1 Part 2  Part 3 Outcome 
Theory Economic 
boost 
 
Political 
changes 
Labour 
market 
changes 
Strategical 
choices 
Abolishment 
of separate 
women 
wages 
 
Empirical 
propositions 
 
Contextual 
circumstances 
generate 
stability, but 
shortage of 
labour which 
hinders 
further 
growth 
 
Political 
leaders signal 
introduction of 
new economic 
policies in 
response to 
economic 
growth, and 
freedom for the 
labour market 
parties 
 
 
Indication 
of increased 
productivity 
and 
increase of 
operating 
space 
generates 
calls for 
increased 
welfare 
 
Labour 
union 
officials 
expresses 
support for 
the 
embrace of 
gendered 
interests 
 
 
 
Table 2   A hypothesized causal mechanism linking recession and the Metalworkers’ Unions break from centralised negotiations 
 Scope condition: Metalworkers break from central negotiations 
Causal 
mechanism Cause Part 1 Part 2  Part 3 Outcome 
Theory Economic 
recession 
 
Political 
changes 
Labour 
market 
changes 
Strategical 
choices 
Break from 
centralised 
negotiations 
 
Empirical 
propositions 
 
Contextual 
circumstances 
generate low 
demand of 
workers, and 
low margins 
for wage 
improvements 
 
Political 
leaders signal 
need for 
caution and 
restriction 
regarding the 
economy, and 
signal new 
reforms to 
help the 
industry 
 
 
Indication of 
decreasing 
productivity 
and 
impingement 
of operating 
space 
generates 
irritation and 
frustration  
 
 
Labour 
union 
officials 
belonging 
to the 
insider 
group calls 
for new 
system of 
wage 
formation 
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4.3 Empirical manifestations and selection of material 
This sub-section will present what type of evidence will be collected to establish whether the 
outlined hypothesized causal mechanism and its propositions hold. By collecting empirical 
data following the idea of evidential diversity, we can establish the materials relevance, 
independence and source reliability (Beach 2017; Esaiasson et al. 2010:291). For this thesis, 
historical archives, news articles and additional academic and statistical accounts have been 
used to trace evidence for each part of the causal mechanism. The section will start by 
discussing the cause, and then turn to a combined discussion of the rest of the parts as the 
evidence for part one, two, and three is triangulating between all sources. 
 
Material concerning the cause will, first and foremost, be collected from academic sources 
and will be used to establish a framework and contextual understanding of the financial 
situation surrounding both cases. The initial intention was to solely use statistical databases 
such as the World Bank, OECD, or Statistic Sweden (SCB) but shortly into the process 
realised the complexity inherent to historical economic statistics. The period before 1970, is 
contended (Krantz 2000; Lindbeck 2000; Henrekson 1998). Therefore, I renounced my initial 
aim, and as the information is mostly function as descriptive and the thesis do not aim to 
question previous economic research: my belief is that economic scholars can provide this 
thesis with adequate information. Thereto, the empirical material following the other parts 
will allow cross-checking union leaders perception of the economy. 
 
For the rest of the parts, the material will be collected from various sources and be used in a 
cross-tracing fashion. Moreover, the evidence is expected to be found in all of the sources, to 
all parts. Therefore, the rest of the section will outline historical archives and news articles. 
 
Historical archive  
To trace discourse within LO evidence have been traced using congress protocols available at 
the Swedish Labour Movement’s Archive and Library (Arbark), and includes congressional 
protocols containing transcriptions of debates, affiliated unions motions and the responses 
from LO leaders. Additional reports and statistics regarding, e.g. wage- and membership 
development has also been examined. 
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From these sources, the expectation is to find evidence of for all of the parts regarding the 
economy, political discourse, the labour market reality and strategical choices. Due to the 
intimate bond between the Swedish Social Democratic Party and LO, the party leader usually 
visits the Congress and hold speeches that have been transcribed and can in part provide 
evidence for political signals of the political branch of the labour movement see the financial 
situation and outlook.   
 
The LO Congress is a moment at which members discuss, negotiate and determine the 
framework for the course of action, the agenda, for the next five-year period but also discuss 
the past five-year period (LO 1976:7). Thus, evidence to probe whether part two and three can 
also be found and as such, the protocols constitute the backbone for the study.   
 
Furthermore, from the historical archive at the Library of Gothenburg University a separate 
study of the journal, Fackföreningsrörelsen, published by LO between 1921-1975 out of 
which the following years have been analysed; 1956; 1957; 1958; 1959, and the first half of 
1960. This journal publishes everything from summaries of board meetings, monthly 
economic reports, and most important, debate articles on topics such as women wages, wage 
differentials and other labour market concerns. 
 
News articles 
The collection of news articles is based on two arguments: (1) to fill the gap between each 
LO-congress that occur each five-year, and (2) to enhance source independence and enable 
the collection of political signals, public opinions as well as additional information regarding 
the economic situation. Furthermore, when sampling the news articles, two keywords were, 
primarily, used: women wages (kvinnolöner) and wage formation (lönebildning). 
 
During the collection process, an initial pre-study was conducted using the online databases 
available at Dagens Nyheter (DN) and Svenska Dagbladet (SvD). Moreover, to further build 
upon the evidential diversity, a new sampling process was done using the Swedish National 
Library database covering Swedish newspapers from 1645 to the present, to probe whether 
any additional evidence was of additional value. It shall be noted that this only includes daily 
news outlets. Hence, Fackföreningsrörelsen, is discussed under historical archives. 
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Keywords Time Period # of articles 
Women wages 1946 – 1961  261 
Wage policy 
1946 – 1961  
1976 – 1984 
2378 
1794 
 Total 4433 
 
 
The collected empirical evidence will undergo an evaluation to establish empirical certainty 
and uniqueness. As the evidence will be collected from several different sources, triangulation 
between collected empirical evidence becomes possible and, hence, the accuracy of the 
evidence stronger (Beach & Pedersen 2016:193). 
 
However, as process tracing tends to proceed inductively, data may or will be discovered 
throughout the research process. As to escape the problem of infinite regress, a timeline for 
the analysis will be developed (figure 4; figure 5). Furthermore, the process of evaluation and 
sampling will follow the idea of theoretical saturation. Hence, the collection of data will stop 
when similar patterns occur (2016:196; Esaiasson et al. 2010:190-191) The years of the study 
were selected after a pre-study indicated that these years were essential and needed further 
evidence. Thereto, years not selected have been traced empirically through other sources 
deemed suitable following the idea of empirical saturation. 
 
4.4 Argumentation for case selection 
Two cases have been selected: (1) The abolishment of separate women wages in 1960, and (2) 
the Metalworkers Unions decision to divert from the central negotiation system in 1983. 
These cases are selected both out of methodological and historical reasons. Furthermore, if 
empirical evidence is found for all parts in one case, it only allows restricted claims of 
inference as a single case study only can prove that the hypothesised causal mechanism 
functioned in this particular case (Beach & Pedersen 2017; 2016: 319). Therefore, a second 
case is selected based on prior knowledge, which provides variation in terms of economic 
circumstances. By probing a second case where we have variation in the cause, it could render 
knowledge of the necessity of economic factors for the embrace of outsider interest and 
equalising wage policies (George & Bennet 2005:.246; Beach & Pedersen 2012). 
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The case selection has been guided by the cases historical importance for the Swedish labour 
market model, and hence the wage formation system and its ability to achieve equalisation of 
wages. First, the abolishment of women wages is regarded as important for the decline of the 
gender wage gap (e.g. Edin & Richardson 2002), and the metalworker’s breakout from 
centralised negotiations is regarded as a critical juncture for the whole wage formation 
process in Sweden (Martin 1992:60). 
 
Above these considerations, Sweden and Swedish unionism constitute an excellent example 
to study as to its encompassing unionism and its present, relatively, high level of equality and 
the freedom the Swedish labour market model provides to the social partners in the labour 
market (Davidsson & Emmenegger 2012:208). Hence, I argue that understanding the 
decision-making process of the labour unions, as it affects the labour market as a whole, is 
essential for the understanding of wage equalisation as representation fails to explain it. 
 
4.5 Choice of time-period 
Thus far, we have established the theoretical framework and discussed the methodological 
framework in terms in terms of how and what to analyse, the only missing part before the 
analysis is the establishment of a timeline for each of the cases. (Ricks & Liu 2018). Vital as 
it constitutes the backbone upon which the whole test using process tracing rest. Without an 
outlined time-period, a problem of infinite regress may emerge as there can always be more 
steps to take, as well as further events to study (Collier 2011). 
 
As process tracers have the indulgence to study events in retrospect, thus the ability to outline 
critical junctures and moments in time otherwise deemed impossible (Bennet & Checkel 
2014:26). In the timelines (see appendix), besides the outcomes as constituting the critical 
junctures, other points have been selected based on the occurrence of LO Congress. Thereto, 
in the first case, the first and second report of women wages delivered to LO in 1946 and 
1950 are selected as events of importance.  
 
4.6 Delimitations and thoughts 
Before moving to the analysis, a few notes on the limits of the selected method. As the 
selected method enables an in-depth case-study analysis of the cases, the findings have 
limited level of generalisability (Beach & Pedersen 2016:330). The above-discussed notions 
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of transparency of research design and triangulation of sources will strengthen and enable 
strong validity and reliability. Also, the selected sources do not include interviews that are 
discussed as beneficial to process tracing research as it can provide a deep understanding of 
how actors relevant to the cases perceived the situations and help reconstruct the occurred 
event (Tansey 2007).  Do to the somewhat substantial distance in time to the first case, and to 
some extent the second I considered interviews as either impossible or risking the reliability 
due to retrospective accounts. 
 
5. Analysis 
5.1 Abolishment of separate women wages 
The question of wage formation and wage differentials have been of utmost concern within 
LO since its genesis in 1898, and the question of gender wage differentials was discussed as 
early as 1909 (Arbetartidningen 1951). However, the first substantial step waited until 1943, 
when LO answered demands from the women-dominated union, the Swedish Union of 
Tailors and Garment workers, and appointed a special commission for the investigation of 
how to tackle the gender wage differentials (Hirdman 1998:19,32). In 1946, this commission 
delivered a report that constitutes a launching pad for the discussion and debate inside LO, 
which ultimately led to the agreement between LO and SAF in 1960. 
 
Before moving on to the analysis, the report in 1946 generated no significant changes on 
behalf diminishing the gender-wage gap. LO showed near to no interests toward the matter, 
and even the initiating union own newspaper showcased a total silence. In sum, the women 
were alone (Sund 1991:41). As discussed in previous sections, the assumption is that the 
economic circumstances were the cause behind the domino-effect that leads to the outcome: 
the abolishment of separate women wages, which marks the start of diminishing wage 
differentials between men and women workers (Hirdman 1998:60; Sund 1991:57). The 
following sections will probe the hypothesized causal mechanism following a sequential 
outline, guided by the five-year periods between LO-congresses. 
 
Cause: Economic growth  
To provide pre-understanding of the economic circumstances pervaded at the time between 
1946 and 1961, a brief discussion to outline the Swedish economy follow. First, at the end of 
the Second World War in 1945, the world was to recover to a state of normality and Sweden 
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had an economic advantage on the world. It kept neutral throughout the war and had stable 
industries with on-going production (Krantz 2000). Thereto, Sweden was able to keep 
growing the years that followed, and at the end of 1960, the country was regarded as one of 
the world’s wealthiest countries in the world at the end of 1960 (Henrekson 1998). 
 
 
 
Tabell 3  
Swedish percental growth in GDP per capita in comparison to two groups 
of countries, 1925 – 1965. Constant prices. 
Swedish growth in comparison to 
  Sixteenth  
industrialized countries 
The six richest  
countries 1970 
1925-1935 20,5 19,2 
1935-1945 11,9 19,9 
1945-1955 -4,7 -16,5 
1955-1965 -1,8 1,3 
Source: Krantz 2000 
The sixteenth countries: Australia, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Netherlands, Italy, Japan, 
Canada, Norway, Switzerland, Germany, UK, USA, Austria, and Sweden. 
The six richest countries: Denmark, France, Germany, Switzerland, UK, and Sweden. 
 
As the data are historical, there is considerable uncertainty in the accuracy of the numbers in 
the table above, and due to this, economic scholars depict different pictures of the Swedish 
economy. Krantz argues that Swedish economic ceded back starting already in 1950 and 
argue that the only reason behind the continuation of the rising Swedish welfare was the 
outside worlds development after the war (Krantz 2000). While others indicate that Swedish 
economic growth was exceptional until 1970 (Henrekson 1998), what remains certain is that 
the period between 1950-1970 is considered as the golden age of capitalism, and whether or 
not Swedish economy was booming during this period and how that affected the agenda of 
LO, and the equalisation of wages will become evident in the following sections. 
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Phase 1: 1946 – 1951, Post-war caution and metalworker power 
… we shall not forget the enormous problems today’s rulers face while attempting to restore our society. 
How these problems are solved will affect us and all of the working class throughout the world (August 
Lindberg at the 9th LO-congress held in 1946, LO 1946:3, my translation). 
 
The government, the Social Democratic Party, and LO often ran their policies in synchrony 
with a holistic view balanced between providing the working class with improvements and 
keeping the general public satisfied (Kommissionen för ekonomisk efterkrigsplanering 1945; 
Dagens Nyheter (DN) 1945).  Moreover, at the beginning of this period, growing numbers of 
LO members express irritation over the unfair situation over decreasing real wages. Which 
generated that the most voiced interest was broad wage improvements, and gender-wage 
differentials were side-lined from the agenda. The LO-chairman, August Lindberg, addressed 
the question of women wages as a problem of modest size, and as such, had LO’s modest 
attention (Arbetartidningen 1946). 
 
The first report regarding women wages delivered in 1946 called for central negotiations led 
by LO to solve the matter, with one proviso, the wage formation process was not to harm 
male wages and their improvements (Sund 1991:33, 34). Moreover, the enhancement of 
women wages hinged upon economic circumstances and the overall achievement of full 
employment. Thereto, LO argued that the women labour were less valued, and increased 
wages will affect their employability (LO 1946:197). 
 
The argumentation from the Secretariat1 followed that of the Swedish Commission for post-
war economic planning, and the overall labour movement, a direct effect of the intimate 
relationship between LO and SAP - Expressed during the 13th LO Congress, as a great 
benefit for the working-class (LO 1946:5). Furthermore, the report argued that the solution of 
the issue of women was not a question of wage improvements, it was a question of education 
as to enlarge the labour market for women, so that they could leave low-wage sectors 
(Hirdman 1998:27,33). Meanwhile, members of Metall argued that employers use women 
labour as a way to keep cost low, enforce competition and undercut general calls for wage 
increases for the male workers (LO 1946:198). The discussion within LO at this moment was 
a question of equal pay, to minimise the risk of competition from women labour (Sund 
1991:27). However, LO and the report wanted to solve the matter through centralised 
                                               
1 Elected representatives from affiliated unions that talk on behalf of LO 
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negotiations with SAF, but the members were by no means united, and the motion lost as the 
members argued it would only procrastinate its solution (DN 1946). 
 
Despite increasing calls for wage and welfare improvements within LO, August Lindberg 
maintained a serious and cautious approach. He continued to argue that the question of gender 
wage differentials, was a question of modest size as men and women rarely occupy similar 
positions at the workplace (LO 1946:199).  Moreover, the chairman argued for a continuation 
of the restricted wage policy throughout the congress period, as the industry and business 
sector need to recover and adapt. The Secretariat was to change their attitude toward the wage 
policy when the productivity increased (LO 1946:197; DN 1946). 
The irritation and resistance to the forwarded wage policy continued and resulted in a 
complete gridlock at the negotiation process of 1948. Similar to 1945, the labour market 
peace was now the hand of Metall as LO and SAF had co-ordinated the wage negotiations and 
reached an agreement. Its ratification was in the hand of Metall, but they were reluctant as 
they believed the wage policy failed to meet their requirements. While they finally agreed on 
the proposal, this makes visible the hierarchal structure within LO (Expressen 1948). 
 
LO was during the period, divided into two groups, whereas one favoured aggressive wage 
policies, and one favoured an agenda of caution. To induce some calm to the working-class, 
the minister of finance, Per Edvin Sköld, went public and argued for the need for continued 
caution as the Swedish industry still required space to recover. The argument that the Swedish 
economy rested upon the industry and that its success was cardinal for the success of the 
Swedish society kept being the prime argument and guide for how LO was to act (DN 1950a). 
The LO-chairman, Axel Strand, during his May 1st speech, talked about the fine art of 
limitation, suggesting that the labour movement need to be cautious to not damage the 
economy and the welfare of the general public (DN 1950b). According to economic reports, 
Sweden suffered by a large trade deficit caused by increased import that the Swedish industry 
was unable to meet as Sweden suffered from both shortage of labour (Höök 1949) and 
problems with absenteeism, caused by the absence of social welfare (Holm 1949). LO reports 
that they agreed with the government to join them in their agenda of stabilisation, aiming at 
restraints in all areas, motivated by the fact that stability in price may halt the decrease of real 
wages (LO 1951:4). 
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In response to LO-leaders and government rhetoric, Metall were loud opponents of the 
strategy of caution and restriction as they believed they had suffered enough during the war. 
During the Metall Congress in August 1950, members viewed the economic situation as 
positive as the industry showed productivity increases, premises for wage improvements. 
Parts of the union wanted to break out of LO as to achieve higher welfare and protect the 
interests of the metalworkers, not the demands reflecting the labour movement as a whole 
(DN 1950c) 
 
At the end of 1950, the second report, regarding women wages and workers were released. 
Representatives from LO and SAF made a joint statement where they argued that a total 
equalization of wages between men and women workers is essentially impossible. Due to 
certain limits, based on their quality as workers (DN 1950d). The report argued that it remains 
unreasonable to form wages based on gender and that equal pay for equal work is reasonable. 
However, “…wages have to follow that of individual ability to produce, consideration taken 
to the total cost of production as it should remain the same regardless of gender…” (2nd 
report on women wages quoted at 10th LO-congress in 1951:262). The report, by default LO 
and SAF, valued women labour as less valuable despite the idea of equal pay for equal work. 
They were arguing that women were less versatile. Moreover, LO and SAF agreed that the 
primary responsibility for the gender-wage differentials should be in the hand of the 
individual union – not a subject for central negotiations between LO and SAF (Hirdman 1998: 
42-43; LO 1951: 261-262). 
 
Phase discussion 
In the period of 1946-1951 the forwarded agenda were structured under the guidelines set by 
SAP, with LO in conjunction, and clearly followed the economic development. In terms of 
political changes, the government kept the price-and wage freeze policy established during 
WWII which kept both employers and workers in a tight grip and set the boundaries for 
labour market negotiations and the prospect for gender-wage equalisation. 
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Table 1.1 Summary of phase 1 
 Scope condition: Labour unions embrace of abolishment of women wages 
Causal 
mechanism Cause Part 1 Part 2  Part 3 Outcome 
Theory 
Economic 
boom 
 
Political 
changes 
Labour 
market 
changes 
Strategical 
choices 
Abolishment 
of special 
women 
wages 
Empirical 
propositions  
 
Contextual 
circumstances 
generate 
stability, but 
the shortage 
labour hinders 
further growth 
 
Political 
leaders 
signal the 
introduction 
of new 
economic 
policies in 
response to 
economic 
growth 
 
 
Indication 
of increased 
productivity 
and 
increase of 
operating 
space 
generates 
calls for 
increased 
welfare 
 
 
Labour 
union 
officials 
express 
support for 
the 
embrace of 
gendered 
interests 
 
Agreement 
Empirical 
manifestations 
 
Phase 1 
- Shortage of 
labour 
- Trade deficit 
- Industry in 
need of 
investment to 
meet the 
demands 
 
- Caution 
- Recovery 
- Unity 
- Recovery 
 
- Caution 
- Fine art 
of 
limitation 
 
 
Stabilisation 
agenda – 
guided by the 
government 
- 
Decentralised 
negotiation 
 
During the studied period, the findings suggest that LO had a holistic view of society. 
Moreover, as the Swedish society was highly dependent on the industry, the wellbeing of the 
industry was of utmost importance.  Moreover, the cooperation between the two branches of 
the labour movement, SAP and LO, manifested itself under the parole of fine art of limitation 
and the post-war commission. 
 
The analysis suggests that none of the expected premises for equalising agendas are prevalent, 
thus, the behaviour and actions of LO follows the expectations under the hypothesised causal. 
LO act out of protecting their power, the jobs of insiders and view the question of women 
wages as a question of modest concern. 
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Phase 2: 1951 – 1956 – Indication of loosening up 
In August 1951, the Swedish Minister of Commerce attended the Union of Swedish Food 
Workers Congress and argued for wage formation anchored in reality. He claimed that 
improving wages is no real achievement for the labour union movement. Instead, a far more 
complex task is to forward a policy that secures the private economy for the workers” 
(Svenska Dagbladet (SvD) 1951). 
 
In response to questions of how wage increases would affect the economy, Ericsson 
responded that the economy needed stability and not the risk of inflation – Implying that wage 
increases would generate increased inflation and hence, reduced real wages. This 
argumentation was a month later, at the 14th LO congress, expressed by Axel Strand manifests 
the intimate bond between the two branches of the labour movement (LO 1951:5). 
 
Axel Strand went from addressing the question of women wages as modest, to outlining 
women concerns as not the most important for women. Instead, policies that could facilitate 
the journey from domestic work to the labour market were needed (Expressen 1951).  
Corresponds with the second report on women wages, who on the one hand, argues that equal 
pay for equal work is reasonable. While on the other, argue that women are less valuable and 
wage improvements would force them out of the labour market (LO 1951:263). 
 
The Secretariat argued that the current state of the Swedish economy only allowed them to 
forward restricted wage demands. Sweden's large trade deficit worried the union and 
indicated a slow recovery pace of the industry (LO 1951:4). However, among members, the 
irritation over stagnated wages augmented and just months after the Congress LO publicly 
argued for the need to compensate the working-class and cannot form their policies out of 
concerns for the overall society before their members' interests forever (DN 1951). 
 
LO failed to achieve equal pay for equal work, separate women wages were still in all 
agreements and both SAP and LO, dismissed all calls to solve the issue through legalisation. 
A reality that caused problems for Axel Strand, and during a radio-interview he came under 
scrutiny as the interviewee wonder in not equal pay in its essence was a question of 
democracy. He responded, gender-wage differentials might be a question of democracy, but 
legalisation will not result in any progress on behalf for women workers. He emphasised, 
 32 
wages, and wage formation are decided through negotiations between LO and SAF, and not 
through state legalisation (Arbetartidningen 1951). 
 
At the beginning of 1955, the scope for any form of wage improvements remained dim. The 
Minister of Finance, Sköld, stated that the unions need to continue their restricted agenda and 
threatened by state intervention to calm the market if not (DN 1955a). Upon which LO 
responded that at some moment, the working-class has to be remunerated for its suffering and 
hardship during and in the post-war period. Wage improvement cannot be wandered off by 
the threats of inflation in eternity (DN 1955b).  
  
While this initially might be seen as an indication of a new wage policy entering the LO-
agenda, and possible scope for women wage improvements, it was not. Instead, LO ended up 
in a two-fronted conflict, as SAF called upon Strand and emphasized that the economic 
situation required wariness, and SAF ordered 500 000 workers in lockout as they saw any 
demand of wage improvements as directly damaging the competitiveness of Swedish industry 
and the Swedish depression (DN 1955c). Four days after SAF announced lockout, the 
government intervened with a commission and hindered a complete productivity stop (SvD 
1955). Meanwhile, a process inside LO started and ended with the announcement that LO will 
pursue restricted wage demands as long as the industry was recovering (DN 1955d). 
 
In what seems like an attempt to calm LO and any demands for wage improvements, the 
Swedish prime minister, Erlander, went public to innuendo that the government had 
overestimated the ability of LO to unify the labour movement under the parole and goal of 
securing low levels of inflation (DN 1955e). 
 
Phase discussion 
Between 1946-1956, LO conducted two extensive studies regarding women wages and 
women labour. In sum, LO and SAF had at the end of 1950 agreed that wages should follow 
the individual workers' ability to produce, regardless of gender. However, both parties still 
viewed women as a less valued labour force, and they, therefore, received less pay (Holmberg 
1956). 
 
While the economy started to create rents for LO and its affiliated unions to collect, the 
economic circumstances with high inflation created an environment in which LO was forced 
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into restriction. By the employer SAF, but also by the political branch of the labour 
movement, SAP. Moreover, the irritation within LO was pushed back by the impact factor of 
political signals.   
 
Table 1.2 Summary of phase 2 
 Scope condition: Labour unions embrace of abolishment of women wages 
Causal 
mechanism Cause Part 1 Part 2  Part 3 Outcome 
Theory 
Economic 
boom 
 
Political 
changes 
Labour 
market 
changes 
Strategical 
choices 
Abolishment 
of special 
women wages 
Expectation 
for the causal 
mechanisms 
to hold 
 
Contextual 
circumstances 
generate 
stability, but 
shortage of 
labour which 
hinders further 
growth 
 
Political 
leaders 
signal 
introduction 
of new 
economic 
policies in 
response to 
economic 
growth 
 
 
Indication of 
increased 
productivity 
and increase 
of operating 
space 
generates 
calls for 
increased 
welfare 
 
 
Labour 
union 
officials 
expresses 
support 
for the 
embrace 
of 
gendered 
interests 
 
Agreement 
Empirical 
manifestations 
 
Phase 1 
- Shortage of 
labour 
- Trade deficit 
- Industry in 
need of 
investment to 
meet the 
demands 
- Caution 
- Recovery 
- Unity 
- Recovery 
- Restrictions 
 
- Caution 
- Fine art 
of 
limitation 
 
 
Stabilisation 
agenda – 
guided by the 
government 
- 
Decentralized 
negotiations 
Empirical 
manifestations 
 
Phase 2 
Inflation 
causing real 
wages to 
decline 
- Similar 
agenda as 
pursued 
during 
1946-1951 
- Threats of 
state 
intervention 
  
- Lockout to 
stop demands 
for 
improvements 
- Started 
as last 
phase 
- Irritation 
over the 
welfare of 
union 
members 
 
Centralized 
negotiations 
- 
Caution while 
probing for 
improvements 
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Phase 3: 1956 – 1961 – Breakthrough 
Our tactics, and our methods, as a union have to be adapted to real conditions. We 
cannot form these ingenuously or allow ourselves to form these after our preconceived 
notions or principles (Axel Strand at the 15th LO Congress in 1956:8, my translation). 
 
In 1956, the shortage of labour in the Swedish labour market started to be tangible and 
hindered revitalisation of the economy. Moreover, LO expected women to constitute the 
foremost labour pool as they were the only available non-activated part of the society 
(Holmberg 1956:24). In effect, LO witnessed a significant influx of new members to LO and 
the organisation reached a milestone as the worlds most unionized country. Half of the influx 
of members were women workers, addressed as positive as it strengthened the bargaining 
power (LO 1956:5; Lundström 1957). However, as a direct consequence of an increasing 
member base, an increased set of interests wanted to be part of the LO agenda. Axel Strand 
stated:  
 
…all groups and individuals strive for the greatest possible freedom to act out of their 
sole convenience, in accordance to his or her interests, but if this maxim leads to 
competition that produces a situation of better or worse off, the question arises of 
halting those who have failed (LO 1956:8). 
 
To the 15th LO congress, the initiator of the first report on women wages, SUTGW, delivered 
a motion expressing impatience over the slow progress of equalisation. While women had 
received wage increases equivalent that obtained by men, the gender-wage gap persisted (LO 
1956:190). They also pointed to the fact that women are in demand due to shortage of labour, 
and it should therefore be of LO’s interest to forward demands to achieve fair wages for 
women (LO 1956:193). 
 
…according to the report on women wages, it is up to each contracting part, to arrive at 
their organisational wage policy conclusion. Taking their sectors condition into account 
(LO 1956:197). 
 
The Secretariat responded by defending LO, claimed that no individual union had called for 
assistance during the last Congress period and that there is no sign of conflict caused by the 
question of women wages. Thus, as long as wage formation were handled in a decentralised 
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fashion and no affiliated union called for help, LO was not to blame (LO 1956:196). Maria 
Brandt responded with frustration toward the unions' ignorant approach to women wages, and 
questioned the whole idea of wage policies based on solidarity: 
 
To all men here at the congress, have you considered the fact that a true act of solidarity 
would be for you to relinquish parts of your wage increases to your fellow women 
colleagues. Then, your statements of unreasonable, and unjustifiable wage differences 
would be more than hollow words (Maria Brandt at the 11th LO congress 1956: 206). 
 
However, LO calculated the prospect for wage improvements during 1956-1957 as minimal 
and continued their path of restricted wage demands (Lind 1956b:400), explained by the 
unstable atmosphere for the Swedish export-dependent industries (Aftonbladet 1956). 
Moreover, at a meeting with LO, the Swedish minister of finance, Gunnar Sträng, stated that 
the uncertain development has caused the government to consider whether their control over 
prices and inflation were sufficient. He continued to argue that the social partners had to 
consider the overall economic situation and have a holistic view, Sweden above the members, 
Otherwise, the government would intervene in the wage formation process (Expressen 
1956b). 
 
In an article in LO’s journal, Fackföreningen, James Rössel who worked in the labour 
commission writes that the gender-wage differentials are an effect of women diversity and not 
men’s intentional and conscious resistance (Rössel 1957:13). While blaming women and 
officially supporting some form of equalisation of wages, LO tried to protect other spheres in 
the labour market from women interference. The night jobs. 
 
“… the requirement for a restriction of the night-time work ban, not to mention the 
requirement of abolition of the prohibition – is not borne by the women involved in 
industrial work themselves, nor by their trade union” (Blomgren & Bolin 1957, p.310)  
 
Something of a tipping point to the question of gender-wage differentials was the 
investigation conducted by the Swedish National Labour Market Board that indicated that 
women labour force was less sensitive to cyclical and seasonal variations than their male 
peers. Their findings contradicted the general notion expressed by LO throughout the period, 
that women were less valued, capable and that their jobs were susceptible to wage increases. 
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This reality also counters the general understanding that it would be reasonable for women to 
be affected first and stand back for male workers as they are family providers (Blomkvist 
1958:481-482). 
 
The report, came at a moment were the economic circumstances started to present itself as 
favourable, causing LO to suddenly expect wages to increase during 1959 and 1960 
(Expressen 1959). Thereto, the women labour was now vital and essential for the Swedish 
economy and industry (Arbetartidningen 1959a). LO expected the production in the industry 
to increase by 4,5% for each year of the 1960 and estimated that they now would have room 
to demand and provide their all their members with wage and welfare improvements (Axelson 
1960). In terms of profits, the industry expected them to increase by approximately 25-30% 
(Arbetartidningen 1959c). 
 
All in all, the economic situation was favourable, and wage increases deemed possible and the 
leaders within LO argued for substantial increases. So, at the end of 1959, LO announced 
their recommendation for the next round of negotiation stated: 
 
The current system with separate wage rates for women is abolished. We instruct our 
affiliated unions to apply the same wage rates for women and men. In cases where 
women perform the same work as men, the same wage rate shall apply. The piece rate is 
calculated according to the same principles as for male workers (Blomkvist 1959, 
p.363). 
 
Following this declaration, Metall decided to push for the total removal of the notion of 
women and male workers and move toward a unitary notion, workers. Their push also 
included a general minimum wage increase (Dagens Nyheter 1959).  
 
Furthermore, during the period between the 14th and 15th LO Congress, the organization 
continued to witness a significant influx of members that would have been more significant 
were there any more presumptive workers. Sweden suffered an immense shortage of labour, a 
shortage that span through most sectors of the labour market (LO 1961:2). Regarding the new 
wage formation directive, LO saw it as a great interest to the men that women wage was 
arranged in a better way than before, as they argued that male wages were affected by 
undercutting from women labour (LO 1961:191) 
 37 
Phase discussion 
The initial phase of this period leading up to the agreement to abolish separate women wages 
initially followed the same pattern as the second phase. A pattern that were kept in place be 
threat of intervention in the wage formation process by governmental officials, as Gunnar 
Strängs threat to intervene in 1956 (Expressen 1956b). However, something happened when 
the labour market report of 1957-1958 concluded that women were less volatile on the labour 
market than their male co-workers. Add to this that the economy started to grow significantly 
in 1958-1960 and suddenly LO embraced the abolishment and move toward a unitary wage 
structure. 
 
In, sum the combination of the market report indicating that women workers threatened the 
superior male position on the labour market, and the economic boom generating rents to 
collect created an environment in which LO embraced an encompassing, wage-equalising 
agenda. As for the hypothesised causal mechanism, the empirical evidence of political 
approval to pursue a more aggressive wage policy are scarce, however, due to the intimate 
bond between LO-SAP established empirically in phase one and two, I contend that, with 
some caution, SAP was either informed or even complicit in the decision. 
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Table 1.3 Summary of phase 3 
 Scope condition: Labour unions embrace of abolishment of women wages 
Causal 
mechanism Cause Part 1 Part 2  Part 3 Outcome 
Theory 
Economic 
boom 
 
Political 
changes 
Labour 
market 
changes 
Strategical 
choices 
Abolishment 
of separate 
women 
wages 
Expectation 
for the 
causal 
mechanisms 
to hold 
 
Contextual 
circumstances 
generate 
stability, but 
shortage of 
labour which 
hinders further 
growth 
 
Political 
leaders 
signal 
introduction 
of new 
economic 
policies in 
response to 
economic 
growth 
 
Indication of 
increased 
productivity 
and increase 
of operating 
space 
generates 
calls for 
increased 
welfare 
 
Labour 
union 
officials 
expresses 
support for 
the 
embrace of 
gendered 
interests 
 
Agreement 
Findings 
phase 1 
1946-1951 
- Shortage of 
labour 
- Trade deficit 
- Industry in 
need of 
investment to 
meet the 
demands 
- Caution 
- Recovery 
- Unity 
- Recovery 
- Irritation 
 
- Caution 
- Fine art 
of 
limitation 
 
 
Decentralised  
- 
Stabilisation 
agenda – 
guided by the 
government 
Findings 
phase 2 
1951-1956 
- Inflation 
causing real 
wages to 
decline 
- Slow 
recovery 
- Similar 
agenda as 
pursued 
during 1946-
1951 
- Threats of 
state 
intervention  
- Lockout to 
stop demands 
for 
improvements 
- Started as 
last phase 
- Irritation 
over the 
welfare of 
union 
members 
Centralised 
- 
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5.1.1 Case discussion 
The analysis of the abolishment of separate women wages started under the assumption the 
economic boom would lead to equalising behaviour, and hence the abolishment of separate 
women wages. Moreover, the phases were divided into five-year periods following the 
occurrence of LO Congress and had all been probing for evidence connected to each of the 
parts of the causal mechanism seen in table 1-1.3. 
 
In terms of economic growth, it played a crucial role, but the Swedish GDP per capita relative 
to others (Krantz 2000), not as crucial. The picture is somewhat complicated due to the war, 
even though Sweden stayed neutral throughout the war, it had to adapt to increasing demands 
that had accumulated during the war, causing a trade deficit. In other words, when the 
politicians and LO leaders discussed recovery, they aimed at modern adaptation of the 
industry. The results, however, show that as long as the economic environment were bad, the 
political signals kept LO back and the only way to pursue demands of wage improvements 
were seemingly that of a single union strike. The economic circumstances were unfavourable 
for the probability of equalising agenda until 1958-1959 when the industry demonstrated 
significant productivity increases.  
 
The analysis indicates that negative political signals stopped after the Swedish National 
Labour Market Board concluded their report showing that the superior role of men workers 
was threatened. The economic circumstances, political signals and labour market changes 
were interlinked in an iterative process, and while the support of the hypothesised causal 
mechanism is modest, I contend that the analysis strengthens the assumption that equalisation 
occurs due to pressure from key impact factors. As discussed under phase two, the empirical 
evidence for political signals indicating new reforms or economic policies are scare between 
the years 1956-1960. However, the empirical findings in phase one and two can, with some 
caution, support the idea that SAP was either allowing or supporting LO with their agenda. 
Hence, the case of the abolishment of separate women wages finds moderate support for the 
causal mechanism. 
 
There are several reasons behind the inability to establish empirical saturation for political 
changes between 1956-1960 as the magnitude of data available caused problems for the 
analysis and the probe of the causal mechanism. Specific sources neglected due to time limits, 
sources that might be able to provide further knowledge regarding the political discourse and 
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behaviour during that time and either dismiss the claim of moderate support or strengthen the 
causal mechanism. However, the magnitude of data was helpful to establish the uniqueness 
and reliability of the source, and as such, I contend that the references hold for a critical 
examination (Beach & Pedersen 2016: 330; Esaiasson et al. 2010:191-192). 
 
5.2 Metalworkers union breakout of central negotiations 
The Swedish process of wage formation was between 1956-1983 set in a framework of 
centralised negotiations led by LO and SAF (Martin 1991:5). If the discussion above were 
permeated by how LO went from cautious to forward an encompassing agenda focusing on 
equalisation, the period this second case analysis tackle, were less stable and the relationship 
between LO and SAP labelled as “the war of the Roses”. Disagreements on everything from 
tax reforms to labour market reforms emerged (Tsarouhas 2008:113). 
 
The assumption is that the recession caused initiated a process that leads to the outcome: 
Metall’s break from central negotiations with LO. This occurred under great protest from the 
rest of LO (Tsarouhas 2008:15). However, Metall viewed the break as a possibility to allow 
their members to receive more than they would if they stayed with LO (Martin 1991:51). The 
events of 1983 are viewed as the start of what became the wage formation process been in 
place since 1997, from which wages in Sweden are set by the agreements formulated by the 
export-dependent sector (Danielsson Öberg & Öberg, 2015: 79). The following sections will 
probe the hypothesised causal mechanism following the same sequential outline as the last 
case analysis. 
 
Cause: Recession 
In 1965, the first tangible signs of weakness in the Swedish economy began to sipper through, 
and in 1970 the economy came to halt, and the GDP started to decline. Between 1970 and 
1993, the manufacturing industry’s share of Swedish GDP fell from 26 per cent to 18 per cent 
(Henrekson 1998). 
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Tabell 4  
Swedish percental growth in GDP per capita in comparison to two groups 
of countries, 1965– 1995. Constant prices. 
Swedish growth in comparison to 
  Sixteenth  
industrialized countries 
The six richest  
countries 1970 
1965-1975 -9 -2,5 
1975-1985 -10 -3,8 
1985-1995 -10 -7,7 
Source: Krantz 2000   
The sixteenth countries: Australia, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Holland, Italy, Japan, Canada, 
Norway, Schweiz, Germany, UK, USA, Austria, and Sweden. 
The six richest countries: Denmark, France, Germany, Schweiz, UK, and Sweden. 
 
The world witnessed the worst financial time since WWII, caused by external shocks like the 
spiking oil prices (OPEC crisis). Swedish growth was significantly affected and was lower 
relative to comparable countries. For example, Sweden had only 61% of the growth of the 
OECD average (Krantz 2000). In comparison to the first case, the outlook was negative. We 
will now see how the unstable world economy affected wage formation and LO’s agenda for 
equalisation 
 
Before going into the subsequent analysis, the gender-wage differentials since 1960 has 
witnessed a rather substantial decline. In the industry sector, women wages increased from 
70,2% to 86,4 relative that of male wages and from 66,7% to 82,5% among the blue-collar 
workers in general. According to LO, this was a direct effect of the hard work and wage 
policy forwarded by LO through central negotiations (LO 1976:264). 
 
Phase 1 – 1976 – 1981 
Despite the adverse economic circumstances, LO report that they have been able to pursue an 
agenda that have preserved their members' purchasing power. Made possible as LO and SAP 
united in the cause of full employment and the renewal of working life (LO 1976:3). The 
prime minister Olof Palme expressed great pride over the agenda jointly constructed by the 
two branches of the labour movement. The broad reform package had pushed unemployment 
to an all-time low as only 1,2% were unemployed (Olof Palme at the 19th LO Congress in 
1976, LO 1976:14). 
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The dependency on export and the industry continued to be expressed by LO, a dependency 
they expected to increase as the international economy were unstable (LO 1976:266). The 
success of Swedish export was the decisive factor for the Swedish welfare to improve 
according to LO, and their agenda aimed at securing Swedish competitiveness (LO 
1976:268). While discussing wages at the Congress, members questioned the solidarity-based 
wage formation as unclear and questioned the calculation of women work as guided by 
arbitrary judgement (LO 1976:233,276). Furthermore, for the question of equalisation 
between groups, several unions started to question the whole idea of central negotiations and 
since 1951 forwarded wage policy. The irritation was two-sided; on the one side, the non-
export-dependent sectors arguing for the unfairness that workers in the industry have had 
more significant wage improvements (LO 1976:226, 227).  On the other, Metall, who argued 
that other unions only had unsubstantial claims, and they questioned whether they were 
justified (LO 1976:247). 
 
Olof Palme expressed the following during a visit to the Metall Congress in 1977: "the 
industry can take Sweden out of the crisis, we need to safeguard its cogency" (Olof Palme at 
the Metall Congress 1977, in Lindblom 1977). The Congress was held the year after SAP lost 
the election to the centre-right parties, which seem to have spurred the irritation among the 
Metalworkers as they later went public arguing that the government is pursuing policies in 
direct clash with the labour unions. They called upon the labour movement to unite in total 
coordination to enforce change (Bertil Lundin, chairman of the Metalworkers Union, in 
Althén 1977:4). 
 
As the Swedish Minister of Industry, Nils G. Åsling, presented stimulus packages to save the 
Swedish industry one can see that as adhering to Metalworkers demands, but in reality, this 
made the industry to rationalise their production, and in effect, 800 jobs were lost 
(Salomonsson 1977). In what can be seen as a countermove and preparation, the Transport 
workers' union raised their membership fees to enable and strengthen their capacity to strike 
and go into conflict with their employers (SvD 1978). 
 
Sweden witnessed a financial downturn in 1979, close to a recession and the industry was on 
the decline. The room for wage or welfare improvements were, therefore, minimal (Thiessen, 
1979; Hedengren, 1979). The economic circumstances, in combination with the state policies, 
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made the accumulated irritation within parts of LO to tilt over into obstructive actions. In the 
wage negotiation process of 1979, a local Metall union in Hallstahammar, called 500 workers 
to strike with the main argument that the wage-differentials between white- and blue-collar 
workers cannot continue to dilate (Steen 1979). Or as Brynolf Backman, chairman at Metall 
in Hallstahammer stated: "I support co-ordinated negotiations, but it cannot result in our 
defeat" (Steen 1979: my translation). 
 
The employers had seemingly nothing to offer, and while the white-collar workers had 
received significant wage increases, the LO sector had moderate success in their bargaining 
process, which made Metall call more workers into the strike. Now over 8000 workers were 
engaged in the strike, supported by the chairman of national Metall chairman, Leif Blomkvist. 
While he officially continued to support the centralised and coordinated wage formation 
process, he started to question its value (Ekström 1979a). SAF tried to seize the moment and 
announced that they wanted to decentralise the wage negotiation process and give more 
power to local parties and motivated their stance by pointing at the on-going strikes as a sign 
of discontent among workers (Ekström 1979b). SAF also wanted the government to 
implement tax reliefs to enable increased levels of employment and hence, productivity. 
 
Meanwhile, the wage differentials between white-and blue-collar workers continued to 
increase and had blue-collar workers as the loser (Hedengren, 1979; Kellerborg 1980b; Eklöf 
1980). Also, the government announced austerity, which affects social welfare programs 
(Kjellander 1980). The on-going recession in Sweden called for changes, according to SAF, 
as they argued that the current framework for worker-employer relation is damaging the 
industry (Kjellberg 2011). While not directly adhering to SAF, the government needed to 
secure the peace in the labour market and offered LO and SAF a tax reform if the parties 
reached a wage-agreement (Qvist, 1980). 
 
The period between 1976-1981 was intense, which led to the crescendo in 1980 when Sweden 
witnesses the most significant labour conflict ever witnessed. Thereto, to achieve the change 
SAF wanted, they called upon the government to intervene and change the Swedish labour 
market model. SAF’s aim to transform the Swedish labour market model failed as SAF and 
LO reached an agreement that needed to be agreed upon by all the parties of the labour 
market. However, Metall hesitated and had the labour market peace in their hands but did 
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agree under pressure from the rest of the LO-sector (Ersman 1980) and the notion that the 
export suffered significantly, and industry workers risked their jobs (Petzell, 1980). 
 
The financial situation affected everyone, and a new form of antagonism between groups of 
labour emerged, with representatives from Metal and SIF in the forefront. In a series of 
revealing debate articles between Staffan Kellerberg (1980ab) from Metall and Berit 
Zethraeus (1980) from SIF, we can witness growing antagonism. As the wage formation 
process of 1980 generated high wage improvements for white-collar workers than that of 
industrial workers, the wage differentials between the two labour groups increased. To what 
Metall responded, "it seems like everyone agrees on the idea of wage differentials, but only 
under the terms that white-collar workers gain from the situation" (Kellerborg, 1980a). 
Zethraeus responded by merely stating that they were happy to allow their large group of 
women workers to gain as much as they can (1980). To what Kellerborg responded, the 
solidarity based-wage policy has to enlace the whole labour market. Otherwise, it fails 
(Kellerborg 1980b). 
 
Phase discussion 
The analysis indicates that the lack of labour market policies aiming for the protection of the 
workers in conjunction with adverse economic circumstances irritated the unionised workers. 
The irritation and antagonism ran not only between LO-unions but between white-and blue-
collar workers as the wage differentials were increasing between the two groups (Ekström 
1979ab). This new pattern of antagonism made LO affiliated unions increase members fees to 
enable obstructive activities (SvD 1978), which finally ended up in a mass strike in 1980 
(Kjellberg 1980). In sum, the solidarity-based wage policy was under scrutiny from several 
angles, and the lines of antagonism were running between low-wage and high-wage groups 
within LO, and between high-wage groups within LO and white-collar workers. This situation 
was beneficial for SAF that seized the moment and tried to break the centralised negotiations 
through lockouts and calls for governmental intervention. 
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Table 
2.1   
A hypothesized causal mechanism linking recession and the protection of 
insider interests 
 Scope condition: Metalworkers break from central negotiations 
Causal 
mechanism Cause Part 1 Part 2  Part 3 Outcome 
Theory Economic 
recession 
 
Political 
changes 
Labour 
market 
changes 
Strategical 
choices 
Break from 
centralised 
negotiations 
 
Empirical 
propositions 
 
Contextual 
circumstances 
generate low 
demand of 
workers, and 
low margins 
for wage 
improvements 
 
Political 
leaders signal 
need for 
caution and 
restriction 
regarding the 
economy 
 
 
Indication of 
decreasing 
productivity 
and 
impingement 
of operating 
space 
generates 
irritation and 
frustration  
 
 
Labour 
union 
officials 
belonging 
to the 
insider 
group calls 
for new 
system of 
wage 
formation 
 
 
Empirical 
findings 
phase 1 
Worst financial 
situation since 
WWII 
 
 
Workers 
against the 
workers 
 
Rationalisation  
 
Centre-right 
government 
 
Irritation and 
frustration 
 
New form of 
antagonism 
Strike 
 
System of 
centralised 
wage 
formation 
under 
scrutiny 
Centralised 
 
Phase 2 – 1981 – 1983 
We have for the first time in modern times been forced to go into great conflict. For the first time, we 
have experienced a consequence of years of deteriorating real wages. And, for the first time in nearly 
fifty years, we have been able to feel how political power is no longer used to enforce reforms for the 
good of the majority, but to erode and degrade already achieved progress (LO-chairman Gunnar Nilsson 
at the 20th LO-congress, LO  1981:3, my translation). 
 
There were only adverse reports, both unemployment was increasing, and real wages reduced, 
affecting the LO member the hardest (LO 1981:373). Thereto, LO viewed the government as 
working directly against the labour movement and for the Swedish shareholders (LO 
1981:374). In sum, LO argued that the governmental policies, in conjunction with the 
economic circumstances, made their chances for successful wage bargaining, impossible. 
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In response to the mass strike of 1980, Leif Blomberg from Metall was upset and irritated as 
he argued that Metall and LO were ready to sign an agreement early on but others (read PTK) 
"cheated us, tried to force themselves into a better deal with combat". He continued by stating 
that they all knew that the space for wage improvements was limited due to declining 
production, and the strike only damaged industry workers, as they were to re-create what has 
been lost (LO 1981:380). Metall held the firm view that the solidarity-based wage policy only 
was possible if white-and blue-collars unite, otherwise the wage differentials between the two 
groups would rise. Leif Blomberg called upon LO and the affiliated unions to coordinate their 
actions because what happened in 1980 were not to be repeated (LO 1981:382). The 
Secretariat held the same stance while arguing that coordinated and central negotiations are 
the only possible way forward to achieve solidarity based on diminished wage-differentials 
(LO 1981:374-375). 
 
LO viewed the economic and employment situation in 1983 as distinctly negative, from every 
point of view. They estimated the unemployment levels to rise throughout 1983-1984 and 
called upon the state to stimulate the economy through lowered taxes, and directly targeted 
aid toward low-wage groups (Johansson 1983b). They were worried that if the market 
governs their wages, they will create competition between low-and high wage earners to 
squeeze wages down. With a specific notion that women see their wages as a “supplement” 
and their presence in the labour market will hinder wage improvements if we allow employers 
to (LO 1981:23). Moreover, the only thing that kept unemployment from skyrocket during 
this period was the continuous expansion of the public sector (Brodda 1983). However, this 
caused a bit of a catch-22 situation as more state-led interventions to create jobs, and lowered 
taxes would generate higher inflation levels and damage the real wages and the already 
employed. 
 
Ostensibly, a parallel negotiation process was on-going at the beginning of 1983, one between 
LO and SAF one the one hand, and on the other one between Metall and VF. LO tried to 
coordinate their members under the parole of solidarity-based wage police, while SAF wanted 
to damage the process which caused their central negotiation to a halt (Barkman 1983). Both 
parties initiated or threatened to engage in obstructive activities to achieve their goals 
(Johannesson 1983; Rolfer 1983; Stålnert 1983). Meanwhile, representatives from Metal were 
side-passing the central negotiation process, by continuing the negotiations with their 
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employer association VF. Leif Blomberg called it: as long as there are returns to collect, I 
cannot turn away and dismiss the interest of my members (Expressen 1983a). 
 
In March 1983, the Metalworkers Union diverted from the central negotiation system led by 
LO as they believed they were to achieve a better agreement alone. The reason behind the 
decision was the idea to provide the industry with space to transform and to it, create a 
prosperous industry sector that can compete in term of export. As before, increased 
productivity spill-over into an increased return that may enhance the welfare of the workers 
(Leif Blomkvist interviewed in Expressen by Frankl 1983).  
 
While the diversion from LO's central negotiations was a move of sidestepping LO which 
caused internal antagonism, the chairman of Metall were loved among his members 
(Johansson 1983a). With a united member base, Leif Blomberg argued that their agreement 
acted as a norm, that could help the other unions in their aim to achieve the wage increases 
they wanted (Johannson 1983b). 
 
However, the outbreak and the Metall agreement broke with the LO agenda and during the 
months following the outbreak, the atmosphere between Leif Blomberg and Stig Malm were 
tense. While the Metalworkers argued that their agreement would function as a norm and help 
other LO-affiliated unions to achieve wage increases (Johanson 1983), Malm warned 
Blomberg that everyone abandons the idea of wage policy based on solidarity, the labour 
movement will end up in a situation of a free-for-all. Malm indicated that LO would do 
everything they can to unite the unions within the LO-family (Expressen 1983b). However, 
Blomberg answered by merely stating that Metalworkers are Metall’s priority (Expressen 
1983a). 
 
Metall continued to develop arguments against the solidarity-based wage policy, the 
economic analyst Ingemar Engman outlined arguments for its reformation. The main idea was 
that the policy and system of central negotiations failed to achieve "the best possible 
outcome" for their members. He continued by stating that economic downturn unevenly 
affects the business sectors, and with a wage-policy based on solidarity, they were unable to 
collect the rents they were entitled. Hence, the wage policy should be obsolescent and 
embrace negotiations at the branch level (Engman 1983). Other LO affiliated unions 
responded: 
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As usual when strong and privileged groups forward their opinions, they justify their 
own egoistic interests through muddy argumentation. National responsibility: The 
groups better off shall assume liability by gaining advantages at the expense of others. 
While, others should show allegiance by the means of self-denying (Forssberg, Gerdin, 
Jansson & Nyström 19832). 
 
Phase discussion 
The analysis of phase two starts in a period directly connecting to the mass strike of 1980 that 
left imprints on the atmosphere within LO. Metall argued that LO had been cheated by PTK 
that had managed to dismiss LO’s call for joint negotiations and equalisation of wages 
between the white-and blue-collar movement, which at this moment were increasing. That 
cemented the antagonism discussed in the first phase. 
 
The analysis further shows that the government continued to implement what LO saw as anti-
working-class reforms. These reforms and the economic circumstances damaged LO's 
intention of uniting the affiliated unions under a common agenda. Hence, the antagonism 
damaged the between blue-collar union relationship as white-collar unions forwarded an 
agenda that threatened the privileged position of especially the Metalworkers. Thereto, Metall 
and their new chairman Leif Blomberg saw it as his responsibility to advance his members 
interests, and he argued that wage-differentials between the different sectors could not 
proceed with Metall as the looser. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
2 Göran Forssberg, Roger Gerdin, Björn Jansson, and Lennart Nyström were secretary analysts at the Swedish 
Clothing Workers’ Union, the Swedish Wood Industry Workers’ Union, the Swedish Food Workers’ Union and 
Swedish Factory Workers’ Union. 
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Table 
2.2   
A hypothesized causal mechanism linking recession and the protection of 
insider interests 
 Scope condition: Metalworkers break from central negotiations 
Causal 
mechanism Cause Part 1 Part 2  Part 3 Outcome 
Theory Economic 
recession 
 
Political 
changes 
Labour 
market 
changes 
Strategical 
choices 
Break from 
centralised 
negotiations 
 
Empirical 
propositions 
 
Contextual 
circumstances 
generate low 
demand of 
workers, and 
low margins 
for wage 
improvements 
 
Political 
leaders signal 
need for 
caution and 
restriction 
regarding the 
economy 
 
 
Indication of 
decreasing 
productivity 
and 
impingement 
of operating 
space 
generates 
irritation and 
frustration  
 
 
Labour 
union 
officials 
belonging 
to the 
insider 
group calls 
for new 
system of 
wage 
formation 
 
Empirical 
findings 
phase 1 
Worst financial 
situation since 
WWII 
 
 
Working 
against the 
workers 
 
 
Irritation and 
frustration 
 
New form of 
antagonism 
Strike 
 
System of 
centralised 
wage 
formation 
under 
scrutiny 
Centralised 
Empirical 
findings 
phase 2 
Financial 
situation 
affects 
business sector 
unevenly 
 
Unemployment  
 
Public sector 
kept 
unemployment 
from 
skyrocket 
 
Labour market 
policies – 
reversed robin 
hood 
 
White-collar 
vs. Blue-
collar 
Metall 
breaks out 
from LO’s 
negotiation 
to protect 
its members 
 
Antagonism  
De-
centralised 
 
The study showcases a moment in time under which the whole labour movement was in 
distress. As the relationship between Stig Malm, leader of LO was deteriorate are empirically 
certain, likewise, is it empirically evident that Metall saw it as their right as the backbone of 
the Swedish economy to divert from centralised negotiations as they see it fit. The debate 
between Engman and Forssberg, Gerdin, Jansson and Nyström highlight the tension between 
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the different unions. In sum, the findings of phase two provides considerable support for the 
hypothesis that recession creates an unfavourable environment for the embrace of 
encompassing agendas.  
 
5.2.1 Case discussion 
The within-case analysis of this, the second case, was conducted with the expectation the 
recession would cause non-equalising behaviour of the labour unions, under the assumption 
that the breakout from centralised negotiations was a means to protect insider interests — the 
metalworkers' superior position. 
 
The data demonstrates that the hypothesised causal mechanism linking economic recession 
with the break from centralised negotiations holds insofar that evidence is found supporting 
the proposition for each part. The economic circumstances were unfavourable as 
unemployment went from low 1,2% to 3,2% in 5 years, and rationalisation of the industry 
caused people to lose their jobs. The political signals were working against the working-class 
or at least the industry but also concerning austerity of social welfare. Due to decreased 
productivity and increasing unemployment, the wage improvements halted relative that of 
white-collar workers creating a new line of antagonism, which finally led to a break from 
centralised bargaining. The main reason seems to be feelings of “it is our turn to eat”, and as 
VF was able to provide Metall with wage improvements, solidarity with the LO-sector was 
side-lined. 
 
In sum, the empirical data supports each of the parts and as such, strengthen the hypothesis 
that economic circumstances set in motion a domino effect causing privileged groups to 
protect their interests above others. Therefore, the findings give the hypothesized causal 
mechanism considerable support. However, I would like to highlight that more research is 
needed to strengthen the order of the parts. Neither the analysis of labour market relations nor 
the actual behaviour in the labour market is straightforward, in any sense. The process 
resembles an iterative process, in the sense that they interact and are affected by a severe 
number of factors. For example, Metall were staunch opponents of a restricted agenda in 
phase one, when it became evident that the white-collar workers had achieved better wage 
improvements. However, all the other parts of the causal mechanism were at phase one 
evident, but no split between the LO-affiliated unions occurred. One explanation could be that 
Metall was biding their time and waited until everything reached a tipping point of no return. 
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To clarify the order and at what point split occur, further research using quantitative studies is 
suggested. To examine at what moment unemployment, production, and wage differentials 
reach the actual point of no return. 
 
5.3 Between-case discussion 
The two cases analysed and discussed above can be seen as critical junctures for the labour 
movement, the wage formation process in Sweden and the equalisation of wage differentials. 
The discussion that follows will highlight their differences regarding support of the causal 
mechanism. How the empirical findings have implicated the analysis and whether the initial 
statement that variation in economic circumstances is the prime impact factor for equalising 
wage policies to emerge. 
 
The results clearly show that a study of labour unions and their behaviour in conjunction to 
wage formation without analysing their perception of the economic circumstances is futile. 
The notion of financial circumstances permeated both case analyses, and the empirical 
evidence is strong for this claim. Therefore, the cases show considerable support for the cause 
factor and show that the behaviour changes due to variation in the economy. Hence, the 
equalising effect of wage policies and wage formation. 
 
However, the emphasis on the economy and the holistic approach regards to the society 
differed between the two cases. Which can be explained solely by the variation as in boom 
and recession but could be problematised as it may depend on how close the relationship is to 
political parties. The analysis clearly shows that SAP and LO had an intimate bond 
throughout the first case, but the relationship deteriorated in the second phase. Not only 
because SAP lost the election and role as the leading a political party, but also because of 
their agendas and view on, e.g. taxes started to drift apart. This could be an alternative 
explanation to the behaviour of Metall and changed their perception of responsibility for the 
good of society, hence, their breakout from centralised negotiations. 
 
The relationship to the political branch of the labour movement may complicate the analysis 
of the first part and how political changes impacted the rest of the causal mechanism and the 
outcome. In the first case, the behaviour of SAP affected the strength of labour market 
changes and the strategical choices of LO, even though the empirical evidence is scarce 
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between 1956-1960 as discussed above. The second case both the relationship between SAP 
and LO worsened, and LO viewed the centre-right party as pursuing anti-working-class 
policies. Whether the behaviour or policy outcomes are affected solely by the economy or by 
ideology remains uncertain and would need further research. 
 
Furthermore, regarding part three and strategical choices, the empirical evidence shows great 
variation in behaviour and indicate that it depends on political changes and labour market 
changes. Some matters complicate the ability for definite conclusions even as the mechanism 
is empirically supported. We cannot dismiss the fact that the new patterns of antagonism 
could play a significant role in the behaviour of LO and its affiliated unions. In the second 
phase, most discussions and the subject of importance surrounded the fact that white-collar-
workers and their union achieved better wage improvements which put LO under scrutiny for 
its incapacity to follow or outperform. Metall tried to push LO from the inside to change their 
wage policies, but then the largest strike and lockout in Swedish history occurred. The 
differences between 1946-1960 and 1976-1983 may also be explained by the unique 
bargaining power that Metall as a single union had, and the willingness of VF to break the 
centralised wage formation system. 
 
In sum, I believe that the second case study strengthens the causal mechanism while the first 
indication that it needs to be put under more pressure. One reason behind this might be 
differences in time and the available data. During the analysis, it became tangible that news 
during the period of 1946-1960 and 1976-1983 differed remarkably. Regarding details, the 
period of 1946-1960 was slightly problematic while the 1976 and 1983 provided news in 
abundance. Thereto, the leaders of LO during 1946-1960 were less public regarding their 
views and actions, while the leaders during 1976-1983 were their direct opposite in that 
regard. Both Leif Blomberg (Metall) and Stig Malm (LO) were discussing and debating wage 
formation and wage policies in public, which enabled an intense study between the different 
LO Congresses. 
 
5.4 Generalisability 
The results of a case study using the method of process tracing have limited possibilities for 
generalisability. However, as the results provide the causal mechanisms moderate to 
considerable support and on the basis that the causal mechanism is semi-theories, I contend 
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that we can expect labour unions in a similar context to behave as LO. Moreover, the cases 
indicate that equalisation only occurs under economic and politically favourable 
circumstances and suggest that applying the causal mechanism in other cases may indeed 
show similar results. Thereto, further research to establish at what value of the impact 
mechanisms unions divert from their path-dependent behaviour could provide valuable 
insights and enable across-context generalisability. 
 
6 Theoretical discussion 
This thesis started with stating that the politics of presence fails to explain the development of 
Swedish wages, and the equalising of gender-wage differentials. From the above discussions, 
we can conclude that competing interests and unions that need to aggregate interests, quickly 
produce antagonism in times of scarce returns. 
 
Moreover, the analysis shows that group composition matter concerning high-income and 
low-income groups. Evidence that supports the arguments forwarded by the insider-outsider 
theory (e.g. Lindbeck & Snower 1986), but the notion that the gender composition matter 
finds no support. Based on two findings: first, the number of women involved with wage 
formation and elected to attend Congress were minimal. Second, the question of gender-wage 
differentials might have been brought up by women, but men constructed its solution. I 
contend that Metall and workers within the industry were the epi-centre and the core insiders 
who decided to abolish separate women wages were a way to prevent undercutting. Similar to 
the behaviour of male industry workers during WWII (Milkman 1982). Depending on how 
one interprets the notion of “effective actor for voicing the concern and interests of women” 
(Mansbridge 1999), the conclusion differs. The above analysis indicates that women-workers 
in a male-dominated sector have higher wages than women-workers in the women-dominated 
sectors (LO 1976:264). Findings that indicate that the interests are forwarded sector wise 
based on material interests and as such male-dominated unions neglect to help other sectors. 
However, if women were to achieve higher wages, their position in the union hierarchy would 
increase. 
 
The analysis supports the theoretical assumptions on several occasions. The Metalworker 
strike of 1945 was an example of how insider-outsider theory would assume unions to act 
when they want to forward demands and pressure the employers (Lindbeck & Snower 1986). 
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Thereto, the relationship between SAP and LO as well as LO’s holistic approach toward the 
society is in line with the idea put forward by Rueda that the agenda has to balance between 
insider interests and outsider interests and if upsetting too many, they lose power (2005; 
Lindvall & Rueda 2014). The SLM (Bonacich 1972;1979) theory helps to clarify the 
antagonistic behaviour in both cases, but maybe most applicable to describe the different lines 
of antagonism found during 1976-1983. As such, SLM could explain the break out from LO 
by Metall as merely trying to counter undercutting from the white-collar workers.  
 
In sum, I contend that that results from the analysis strengthen the idea that groups behave in 
an antagonistic manner following the level of privileged status. The strength of this thesis is 
the combination of the theories as it now enables an understanding of how to analyse the new 
forms of antagonism that emerged in this case. In other words, when the direct threat of 
undercutting from low wages groups was minimal or at least not of the utmost concern and 
Metall risked being sidestepped by the white-collar workers they left the solidarity-based 
wage policy as a measure to protect their superior role in the labour market. I contend that the 
results strengthen these theories and their assumption that behaviour follows material interests 
and the protection of a superior position in the labour market.  
 
7 Conclusion 
This thesis set out to probe the prediction that the economic circumstances either facilitate or 
impede equalising wage policies. The results provide moderate support for the case of the 
abolishment of separate women wages and considerable support for the causal mechanism in 
the case of Metall’s breakout from centralised negotiation led by LO. The main conclusion to 
be drawn from this is that representation and group composition matter less than economic 
differences between groups, suggesting that solidarity only occur when the privileged group 
believe it is necessary and enhancing their superior role in the labour market. Moreover, I 
argued that unions change their behaviour in connection to the economic development and 
that boom would create an environment in which unions create equalising wage policies and 
that unions would create wage policies with non-equalising effect. By applying process 
tracing as a method and the construction of causal mechanism, I was able to establish a 
connection between economic circumstances and either equalising or nor-equalising union 
agendas.  
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Furthermore, the thesis contributed to the understanding of labour market behaviour at large 
and labour union behaviour specifically. The thesis has been problematising the assumptions 
put forward by the politics of presence theory and shown that unions acting as an advocator 
for the wellbeing of their members tend to neglect workers from other unions and hence 
antagonism within confederations such as LO emerge. The thesis has also shown that the lines 
of antagonism evolve, changes and disappear depending on the level of threat of undercutting 
and the amount of available rents to collect. As Bonacich (1972) argues, the social relations in 
the labour market are complex, which has occurred evident in this thesis. I, therefore, contend 
that labour market research without a broad overview is futile. 
 
Finally, as the case of the abolishment of separate women wages find moderate support, I 
encourage future research to both have a broader search field in terms of data collection but 
also look more closely to how unions and political parties interact as the political mechanism 
might impact from both the position in government and opposition. Future research should 
examine recent cases by interviewing union members and leaders to examine the reasons 
behind the current policies forwarded by LO. Ultimately, the thesis indicates self-protecting 
behaviour we should be open toward discussions of how wage formation function as even the 
most equal country fails to achieve what has been discussed since 1909, 
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